Supplies!

Going through the "Logistical Support of the Armies" reading, I was tripped up on some of the loggie-speak (Loggie is AF-speak for Logistics troops).

Evil wikipedia has a short guide on Classes of Supply, or you could go straight to Army FM 4-0 to read all the details.

Also, POL = Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants

Red Ball = Ship it express. Still used today to refer to a short-notice, high-priority supply, part, or maintenance fix.

G-4 = General staff code for the Logistics Division (see the Continental Staff System for a rundown of staff codes. Good to know for work in a mil org that the G-3 or the J-3 is Operations, J-2 is Intel, etc. )

COB Analysis

I'd never heard of CAPT Randall Bowdish before, but the man knows how to break down campaign analysis. This article offers a clear, logical approach to campaign, operation, and battle analysis. Moreover, it identifies all the major categories of analysis that can be employed in campaign evaluation. "Hybrid Analysis" seems to best fit the type of evaluations we are doing this semester - any thoughts?

Afghanistan must-see of the week

The current-event savvy readers and authors of this blog may have already seen yesterday's Frontline documentary on Afghanistan, but if you haven't, it's both riveting and a must-watch.

The Dynamics of Doctrine:

The Change in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War.

Lupfer, Timothy T. Leavenworth Paper No 4., (US Army CGSC: Ft Leavenworth, KS 1981)

DOCTRINAL CHANGE DURING CONFLICT:

-The role of leadership is crucial; it should be based on sound tactical principles, input and lessons learned from front-line units and leaders. Doctrine should not be seen as inflexible dogma, to be applied as an article of faith regardless of the situation. Nor should it be a substitute for good judgment. Doctrine is an army’s collective memory, preserving sound principles as a tool for leaders to be adjusted to the situation.
German doctrinal change in 1916-1918

-Serious undertaking; the German Army had deeply ingrained habits from years of intensive peacetime training. (The US Army underwent a similar doctrinal overhaul in 2007-2008, with similar organizational pain.) Successful change of doctrine during conflict demonstrates a thorough process:
· Perception of a need for change
· Solicitation of ideas, especially from battlefield units
· Definition of the change
· Dissemination of the change
· Enforcement throughout the army
· Modification of organization and equipment to accommodate the change
· Thorough training
· Evaluation of effectiveness
· Subsequent refinement
1914-1916 – German Defense focused on retaining ground; troops were packed into forward trenches, and suffered large casualties from Allied artillery. Germany could not keep up the rate of attrition. What is to be done?
20 AUG 1916 – Hindenburg and Ludendorff take over. Ludendorff spearheads a collective staff effort to revamp German defensive doctrine to increase effectiveness while lessening attrition.
German officer interactions reveal a corporate mindset that discouraged “cult of personality” and encouraged teamwork and success. Ludendorff displayed a particular genius for getting the best effort from subordinates and for not falling into the trap of self aggrandizement. Ludendorff was one of many high-level German leaders who visited units seeking effective lessons learned. Ludendorff also used telephone extensively to remain informed. Small, hard working staff took ideas from the field, and refined them into new doctrine.

"They shudder, and it is forgotten"

Gilbert, Martin. The First World War, (Holt: New York, 1994) pp. 301 – 473.
Part 2: War, desertion, mutiny (April-July 1917)

I tried to pick out all the fronts identified in this section of the reading, which are the following:

Western Front; Salonica Front; Monastir Front; Eastern Front; Italian Front. While the Italian, Western and Eastern Fronts are uniform in reference, other fronts seem to go by different names. For instance, the Macedonian Front, the Balkan Front, Mesopotamian Front et al. Is there an authoritative source on this?

This section of the reading mainly focuses on the following:

1. The conflict of interests in Russia between the Bolsheviks and the Provisional Government on participation in the war, culminating with the begrudging agreement by the Petrograd Soviet to support the Provisional Government in continuing the war effort. 
2. The various desertions and mutinies which began to pervade the front lines (particularly besetting the French and Russian troops), along with Petain’s management of the defections and attempt to restore or force morale one way or another. 
3. The long anticipated arrival of the first American troops in May of 1917. 

* Also note introduction of the convoy system in May to mitigate the damages caused by unrestricted submarine warfare.

"A war that had no victors"

Gilbert, Martin. The First World War, (Holt: New York, 1994) pp. 301 – 473.
Part 1: The intensification of the war (Nov. 1916-June 1917)

A lot of names, dates, battles and figures here to digest. There are some interesting observations worth extracting from the general chronology of events:

When the Germans entered Bucharest on Dec. 6, the Central Powers became conquerors of five capitals: Brussels, Warsaw, Belgrade, Cetinje and Bucharest. The Entente held no Central Power capitals in their grasp.

*The Entente Cordiale agreement was made between Britain and France April 8, 1904 and extended to Russia in 1907. The text of the Franco-British Declaration is here.

What happens when political leaders take on strategy?

Craig, Gordon A., “The Political Leader as Strategist,” in Paret, Peter ed. Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 481 – 509.

This is a great discussion of “the relationship between civilian and military authority at that moment in the process of war in which strategy is translated into operations.” Snapshots of the occasional successes and frequent muddlings caused by political leaders attempting to dictate strategy and manage war include the following:

1. Wrong choice, too late. Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, Germany’s first chancellor in WWI. Bethmann replaced Falkenhayn with Hindenburg/Ludendorff, erroneously thinking they would save him – and Germany – from the annexationists.

2. Hands-off, fearful. H. H. Asquith and David Lloyd George, Britain’s prime ministers were, for differing reasons, unable or unwilling to bend their military commanders’ activities (Haig/Robertson) to civilian strategy.

The Price of Glory, Thru May 1916

I'm probably halfway through the battle and the book, but I figured I would drop in some thoughts.

-A recurring theme in the battle is the dominance of artillery, the combat arm that was present in our Overland Campaign study but only played a minor role. On the German side, the initial gains in the first few days were brought about by massive use of heavy artillery from prepared firing positions and supported by established supply lines. Those guns rained down 1800 lb. shells on French troops from miles away. "Men hideously mutilated by the huge German shells seemed utterly baffled by never once having seen the enemy," the author notes on p103.

On the other side, the French artillery response was almost non-existant, and certainly not coordinated for those critical first days. This didn't help the French infantry's resolve either. “The French artillery had become ominously silent, which always had a depressing effect on the infantry.” (p102) Remember that when the enterprising Sergeant Kunze stormed Douamont, the massive fort was only firing one of its 155mm heavy guns, and more importantly was firing at computed positions with no information about where the Germans actually were.

This tide only turned because logistics that favored the Germans in the beginning changed to France's advantage. The backbone of German artillery was the 420mm "Big Bertha" gun (it's where we get the term from) that from the rear lines could fire over German positions and rain down destruction on the French. But when the front line moved forward towards Verdun, planners hadn't realized that they would have to move the guns through the moonscape they had created to get within range of the new FLOT (Forward Line of Troops). Horse teams couldn't tug the guns through muddy blast craters easily, and once they were repositioned, the 1-ton shells were difficult to resupply.

On the French side, the new commander, Petain, was an artilleryman by training and coordinated French responses. With fresh 155's brought in, the French could reach the advancing german infantry without putting themselves at risk from the stranded Big Bertha's.

Perception, misperception, Jervis, Levy and Stein

Robert Jervis, “War and Misperception,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (Spring 1988), 675-700.

It's worth keeping Jervis' definition of misperception in mind while reading this article. He says misperception includes "inaccurate inferences, miscalculations of consequences and misjudgments about how others will react to one's policies."

A few interesting points ... Jervis' discussion of risk-aversion for gains and risk-acceptance for losses and the role this psychological phenomenon can play in conflict. Is this prospect theory (making decisions while dealing with risk)? Levy has an article on prospect theory and rational choice which may be useful.

An important question broached after a discussion of misperceptions in WWI and WWII: did the misperceptions cause the war? Did they even matter at the end of the day? Jervis references Stein, who argues that misperception can lead to cooperation, not just conflict, and questions whether a linkage between a misperception and an impact on the actor's behavior and final outcomes is, in fact, fait accompli.

Most of the conversation on misperception focuses on historical precedent and the Cold War guessing game. I'm interested in what our key perception dilemmas are post-Cold War. In particular, the number of conflicts we are now engaged in where misperceptions occur on a nation state level (Saddam's possession of WMD) and a sub-state/transnational level (al-Qaeda - Bin Laden actually substantiated his threats).

This week on Afghanistan

Amidst the proliferation of op-eds and blog analysis of Afghanistan, a few pieces stand out, marked with unusual clarity of thought. Kissinger's piece in Newsweek is one of those, particularly when he describes the difference between military and guerrilla strategy:

"Military strategy is traditionally defined by control of the maximum amount of territory. But the strategy of the guerrilla—described by Mao—is to draw the adversary into a morass of popular resistance in which, after a while, extrication becomes his principal objective."

Another article that needs to be added to the counterinsurgency reading list is "10 Steps to Victory in Afghanistan" featuring vignettes from the COIN heavyweights - Kilcullen, et al. Of note, the description of "Type A" and "Type B" adversaries by Merrill McPeak:

"The Type A objective of fatally weakening an opponent by destroying assets important to his success — in theory, a measurable process — is replaced in Type B war by the much more complicated, essentially unquantifiable task of defeating him"

Also note Pillar's commentary (in the same article) on Pakistani patronage. His points, while right on, seem to fall into the Type B snare of soft, unquantifiable metrics, as AFCEA's NightWatch observed.

Postscript - 06 OCT: Our classmate's reporting on the Afghanistan debate. Have I mentioned that I love the practitioner-oriented envirnoment cultivated at SSP?

Cultural theories supplement, not supplant realism

Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," International Security 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998), 141-170.

Desch discusses culturalism in security studies. In this nicely organized article he reviews three waves of cultural theories, three problems with assessing the explanatory power of current cultural theories, and three ways culture can supplement (not supplant, as he says quite emphatically) existing theories in national security. While the common thread of these cultural theories seems to be a repudiation of realism, Desch points out that many critiques of realism come from its own adherents, citing Schweller, in an article on bandwagoning vs. balancing (unrelated, but looks like a good discussion of Walt's "balance-of-threat" theory).

Wave I contains little detail; Wave II (Cold War) has a few interesting details. Of interest is the view at the time that the U.S. was cultural inept when it came to strategy, in contrast with the "Clausewitzian" Soviets. Vietnam was used to illustrate this criticism (there does seem to be some merit if you look at McNamara and the whiz kids trying to apply cutting-edge capabilities in a context bereft of cultural understanding). However, Desch points out the similarities between Vietnam and the Soviets' experiment in Afghanistan; and if we look at failure from a relative standpoint, we didn't come out quite as bad as the Soviets did. Wave III, being in full-swing at the time of writing, is where most of the time is spent. Question: have any of the 3rd wave views/concepts gained traction over the last decade? Faded? What is the current cultural contribution to national security studies?

Joint publications, field manuals and systems of systems

Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Planning and Operations, chs IV and V

Thanks to Matt Williams' emailed link, here's the Joint Publication 3-0 in its entirety.

Chapter IV discusses joint operational planning, operational art and design, and assessment. The level of command examined here is the joint force commander (JFC). A few misc. highlights/observations:

Joint Op Planning - uses two processes, JOPES and JOPP (Chapter III).

Interesting paper out of the U.S. Army War College on the JP 5-0 definition of CoGs, how it applies to a nonconventional warfare environment, and the relationship between operational net assessment and CoG analysis. The author has also identifed quite a few sources on the topic of CoGs in joint planning today, also useful.

Chapter V discusses planning for stability operations concurrently with joint ops planning (V-2). Is this basically an introduction to full-spectrum operations from a different angle (the planning?)

This week's Afghanistan fray

The Washington Post has a redacted, unclassified copy of Gen. McChrystal's assessment of the situation in Afghanistan. There's a text searchable version here.
Of note recently, Paul Pillar's commentary on what really constitutes a safehaven and whether Afghanistan is worth the cost to prevent from becoming one. On the other side of the spectrum, John Nagl's call for more troops.

Goldwater-Nichols and Civ-Mil Relations

Cohen, Eliot. "A Theory of Civilian Control," in Supreme Command.

Cohen reviews the main body of thought behind U.S. civil-military relations - Samuel P. Huntington (The Soldier and the State). In his work, Huntington identified a distinctive military mindset; a distinct definition of military officers as a unique profession - directly relating to the management and application of force; and two forms of civilian control over this fighting force - subjective and objective. Objective control, Huntington said, is necessary for a professional, apolitical military. Cohen summarizes the major arguments for and against this theory and offers a slightly more fluid/hybrid take on Huntington's principles, calling for a more nuanced definition of objective control.

Interesting point Cohen makes is the influence of Huntington views on the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. Question: while the intent of Goldwater-Nichols was to solidify an objective control approach to civ-mil relations, did it in fact undermine civilian control? Christopher Bourne seemed to think so in 1998, after the 10-year anniversary of the legislation, when he wrote in Joint Force Quarterly that the consequences were "reducing the checks and balances within and between the executive and legislative branches."

Another question is ... how does the structure of the officer and NCO corps affect the value set, distinctive culture, etc that Cohen discusses? For example, the structure of the NCO corps in the IDF is vastly different (well, non-existent in some lines) according to Patrick Lang's blog, Sic Semper Tyrannis. Leading to a relative breakdown of internal control, particularly on the tactical end of the stick. Sounds a little like Tolstoy's strategic nihilism.

Penguin wisdom