The Price of Glory, Thru May 1916

I'm probably halfway through the battle and the book, but I figured I would drop in some thoughts.

-A recurring theme in the battle is the dominance of artillery, the combat arm that was present in our Overland Campaign study but only played a minor role. On the German side, the initial gains in the first few days were brought about by massive use of heavy artillery from prepared firing positions and supported by established supply lines. Those guns rained down 1800 lb. shells on French troops from miles away. "Men hideously mutilated by the huge German shells seemed utterly baffled by never once having seen the enemy," the author notes on p103.

On the other side, the French artillery response was almost non-existant, and certainly not coordinated for those critical first days. This didn't help the French infantry's resolve either. “The French artillery had become ominously silent, which always had a depressing effect on the infantry.” (p102) Remember that when the enterprising Sergeant Kunze stormed Douamont, the massive fort was only firing one of its 155mm heavy guns, and more importantly was firing at computed positions with no information about where the Germans actually were.

This tide only turned because logistics that favored the Germans in the beginning changed to France's advantage. The backbone of German artillery was the 420mm "Big Bertha" gun (it's where we get the term from) that from the rear lines could fire over German positions and rain down destruction on the French. But when the front line moved forward towards Verdun, planners hadn't realized that they would have to move the guns through the moonscape they had created to get within range of the new FLOT (Forward Line of Troops). Horse teams couldn't tug the guns through muddy blast craters easily, and once they were repositioned, the 1-ton shells were difficult to resupply.

On the French side, the new commander, Petain, was an artilleryman by training and coordinated French responses. With fresh 155's brought in, the French could reach the advancing german infantry without putting themselves at risk from the stranded Big Bertha's.

A note about indirect vs. direct fire: Most civil war artillery (except for special use siege guns) fell into the category of direct fire, meaning that the guy at the cannon was looking at his target and fired a pretty flat trajectory shot across a field at the bad guy. This was good for accuracy and softening up a line, but all those guns had to stop when the infantry assault started because you didn't want to hit your own guys.
The initial German attack used used cannon that engage in "indirect fire" meaning that the gunner can't see the target and merely computes his shot based on range and azimuth (with the help of a spotter who has eyes on the target). That way, a gunner well behind the forward line can support advancing infantry during a battle by lobbing shots over his own friendly troops.

-Unity of Command:

from Army Field Manual FM 3-0:

4-44. Developing the full combat power of a force requires unity of command. Unity of command means that a single commander directs and coordinates the actions of all forces toward a common objective. Cooperation may produce coordination, but giving a single commander the required authority unifies action.

I would argue that the fall of Douamont was the result of a lack of unity of command. The fort was assigned to the military governor of Verdun, outside of the chain of command of all of the troops that were fighting alongside it. So when the Corps Commander, Gen. Chretien, tried to visit the fort, he was denied entry because their commander hadn't announced the entry.

If you were Gen. Chretien, you would be tempted to say, "Fuck it. You're on your own," and not worry about whether it was properly defended or contributing to the fight.

Back to finish off the battle.