Of note recently, Paul Pillar's commentary on what really constitutes a safehaven and whether Afghanistan is worth the cost to prevent from becoming one. On the other side of the spectrum, John Nagl's call for more troops.
In other commentary, today's AFCEA Intelligence NightWatch has some interesting initial analysis about the assessment:
Preliminary Comments on the Commander’s Summary of COMISAF’s Initial Assessment:
General McChrystal’s assessment is now available in redacted form. Its opening sentence, apparently intended as a shocker, exposes a lack of insight. McChrystal’s staff asserts the stakes are high in Afghanistan. The ensuing summary fails to provide credible evidence to support the assertion. High for whom? Afghanistan poses no threat to the US, based on this Assessment.
The conclusion that Afghanistan could become a safehaven for “terrorism” does not contain the adjective “international.” Afghanistan has never been free of attacks aimed at instilling terror, even during its many civil wars. That is how tribes fight without killing lots of people, by demonstration. John Keegan describes this as “pre-modern” warfare.
The threat that motivates US involvement, according to the US President, is “international terror.” That phrase did not make the General’s cut apparently, which raises questions about what the General’s staff thinks it is doing in Afghanistan.
Stopping terror is not what the President said. He spoke about stopping international terror. That would mean the US forces should be fighting in western Pakistan where the international terrorists reside. The Commander’s Summary agrees with and
reinforces the NW contention that the international terrorists are not in Afghanistan, but in Pakistan. The Summary does not make clear how operations in Afghanistan affect the international terrorists in Pakistan.
Those are two of the internal contradictions and inconsistencies in the Commander’s Summary.
The Commander’s Summary does not acknowledge that the Afghan Taliban have sworn to never allow international terrorists – in other words Arabs -- back into Afghanistan, as NW has noted in the past. All sources in the public domain indicate the Taliban have been true to their oath since 2001.
Another serious omission in the Summary is that it fails to use the word “tribe” or any of its adjectival forms. Apparently that word is politically incorrect. The Afghan population just underwent an exercise in public franchise in which the members of tribes voted according to the directions of their tribal leaders or tribal affiliations. What else? The paramount lesson in Afghan democracy from the national elections also did not make the General’s cut, apparently.
The US strategy centers on the need to “protect the population,” whatever that
means. If that does not mean siding with pro-government tribal leaders, then it means nothing. The Afghans pride themselves on being a tribal society, but the ISAF Commander’s Summary makes no concession to that source of Afghan pride. Protecting the “population” without mentioning the tribe betrays a lack of cultural insight.
Other problems include use of conventional war language – victory and defeat, for example. Nothing in Afghanistan’s history has ever been quite that black and white. Victory is always relative and defeat is never permanent. Then there is the comment that “we must fight classic counterinsurgency operations…” Umm… where are such operations defined? French operations, American operations and British operations all were tailored to the threat and the threat was different in each location. The operations were different, as a result. The French and British had success for a time. The last successful US counter-insurgency operation was in the Philippines.
American counter-insurgency operations in Vietnam were supplanted by a conventional invasion by the North Vietnamese Army after Tet 1968. The US operations in the Philippines a century ago were much more like modern day Pakistani operations—brutal and indiscriminate. All successful counterinsurgency
operations that might qualify as “classic” were harsh. The so-called new doctrine in the US Army handbook is not only new, but untested by the US Army. It is distinctly not classic.
A Reader would be justified in wondering what that phrase is supposed to mean to serious people concerned about Afghanistan? Later on in the Summary, the term “comprehensive counterinsurgency operations” is used. In what way are they different from “classic” counterinsurgency operations? What does “comprehensive” mean when ISAF does not have enough troops to protect Kabul, much less 200 of the 399 districts that the Taliban control or dominate?
In what way would ISAF forces protect the Afghans better than the
Taliban who actually do protect the Afghans from ISAF, bring law and order,
provide resolution of local disputes, plus bring justice to corrupt policemen and local officials? If the majority of Pashtuns want a moderate form of Sharia as the basis of government, would ISAF respect that? If Afghans showed they preferred an Islamic Republic, would ISAF honor that?
There is much more worthy of comment, but NightWatch judges from the Commander’s Summary that the people who wrote it let the Commander down. They did not prove the stakes are high; that the situation is imperative; that protection of the population is a reasonably achievable objective; did not examine other more cost-effective alternatives to expanding the forces or show that stability is achievable or desirable in US interests. For example, and arguably, a chronically unstable Afghanistan unnerves both Iran and Pakistan and helps protect US interests in India, Iraq and Israel.
The press accounts say McChrystal has not asked for the 45,000 more troops he thinks he needs. Based on the words in the ISAF Commander’s Assessment about not seeming to be an occupier, he should not be the person making the request at all, if he takes those words seriously. It should be President Karzai.
The failure to mention the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan again spotlights the inconsistent thinking that pervades the more or less disjointed statements in the Commander’s Summary. After reading the Summary, one might well wonder what and where is the strategy? Protecting people is a task, not a strategy. 45,000 more troops will make little lasting difference in that task, except to the families of those killed.
A strategy might be to declare ISAF will defend and enrich all tribes and clans that side with the government in Kabul, renounce Islamic extremism and promote the welfare of women, children, widows and orphans. That might start to transform the fight.
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