Supplies!

Going through the "Logistical Support of the Armies" reading, I was tripped up on some of the loggie-speak (Loggie is AF-speak for Logistics troops).

Evil wikipedia has a short guide on Classes of Supply, or you could go straight to Army FM 4-0 to read all the details.

Also, POL = Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants

Red Ball = Ship it express. Still used today to refer to a short-notice, high-priority supply, part, or maintenance fix.

G-4 = General staff code for the Logistics Division (see the Continental Staff System for a rundown of staff codes. Good to know for work in a mil org that the G-3 or the J-3 is Operations, J-2 is Intel, etc. )

COB Analysis

I'd never heard of CAPT Randall Bowdish before, but the man knows how to break down campaign analysis. This article offers a clear, logical approach to campaign, operation, and battle analysis. Moreover, it identifies all the major categories of analysis that can be employed in campaign evaluation. "Hybrid Analysis" seems to best fit the type of evaluations we are doing this semester - any thoughts?

Afghanistan must-see of the week

The current-event savvy readers and authors of this blog may have already seen yesterday's Frontline documentary on Afghanistan, but if you haven't, it's both riveting and a must-watch.

The Dynamics of Doctrine:

The Change in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War.

Lupfer, Timothy T. Leavenworth Paper No 4., (US Army CGSC: Ft Leavenworth, KS 1981)

DOCTRINAL CHANGE DURING CONFLICT:

-The role of leadership is crucial; it should be based on sound tactical principles, input and lessons learned from front-line units and leaders. Doctrine should not be seen as inflexible dogma, to be applied as an article of faith regardless of the situation. Nor should it be a substitute for good judgment. Doctrine is an army’s collective memory, preserving sound principles as a tool for leaders to be adjusted to the situation.
German doctrinal change in 1916-1918

-Serious undertaking; the German Army had deeply ingrained habits from years of intensive peacetime training. (The US Army underwent a similar doctrinal overhaul in 2007-2008, with similar organizational pain.) Successful change of doctrine during conflict demonstrates a thorough process:
· Perception of a need for change
· Solicitation of ideas, especially from battlefield units
· Definition of the change
· Dissemination of the change
· Enforcement throughout the army
· Modification of organization and equipment to accommodate the change
· Thorough training
· Evaluation of effectiveness
· Subsequent refinement
1914-1916 – German Defense focused on retaining ground; troops were packed into forward trenches, and suffered large casualties from Allied artillery. Germany could not keep up the rate of attrition. What is to be done?
20 AUG 1916 – Hindenburg and Ludendorff take over. Ludendorff spearheads a collective staff effort to revamp German defensive doctrine to increase effectiveness while lessening attrition.
German officer interactions reveal a corporate mindset that discouraged “cult of personality” and encouraged teamwork and success. Ludendorff displayed a particular genius for getting the best effort from subordinates and for not falling into the trap of self aggrandizement. Ludendorff was one of many high-level German leaders who visited units seeking effective lessons learned. Ludendorff also used telephone extensively to remain informed. Small, hard working staff took ideas from the field, and refined them into new doctrine.

"They shudder, and it is forgotten"

Gilbert, Martin. The First World War, (Holt: New York, 1994) pp. 301 – 473.
Part 2: War, desertion, mutiny (April-July 1917)

I tried to pick out all the fronts identified in this section of the reading, which are the following:

Western Front; Salonica Front; Monastir Front; Eastern Front; Italian Front. While the Italian, Western and Eastern Fronts are uniform in reference, other fronts seem to go by different names. For instance, the Macedonian Front, the Balkan Front, Mesopotamian Front et al. Is there an authoritative source on this?

This section of the reading mainly focuses on the following:

1. The conflict of interests in Russia between the Bolsheviks and the Provisional Government on participation in the war, culminating with the begrudging agreement by the Petrograd Soviet to support the Provisional Government in continuing the war effort. 
2. The various desertions and mutinies which began to pervade the front lines (particularly besetting the French and Russian troops), along with Petain’s management of the defections and attempt to restore or force morale one way or another. 
3. The long anticipated arrival of the first American troops in May of 1917. 

* Also note introduction of the convoy system in May to mitigate the damages caused by unrestricted submarine warfare.

"A war that had no victors"

Gilbert, Martin. The First World War, (Holt: New York, 1994) pp. 301 – 473.
Part 1: The intensification of the war (Nov. 1916-June 1917)

A lot of names, dates, battles and figures here to digest. There are some interesting observations worth extracting from the general chronology of events:

When the Germans entered Bucharest on Dec. 6, the Central Powers became conquerors of five capitals: Brussels, Warsaw, Belgrade, Cetinje and Bucharest. The Entente held no Central Power capitals in their grasp.

*The Entente Cordiale agreement was made between Britain and France April 8, 1904 and extended to Russia in 1907. The text of the Franco-British Declaration is here.

What happens when political leaders take on strategy?

Craig, Gordon A., “The Political Leader as Strategist,” in Paret, Peter ed. Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 481 – 509.

This is a great discussion of “the relationship between civilian and military authority at that moment in the process of war in which strategy is translated into operations.” Snapshots of the occasional successes and frequent muddlings caused by political leaders attempting to dictate strategy and manage war include the following:

1. Wrong choice, too late. Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, Germany’s first chancellor in WWI. Bethmann replaced Falkenhayn with Hindenburg/Ludendorff, erroneously thinking they would save him – and Germany – from the annexationists.

2. Hands-off, fearful. H. H. Asquith and David Lloyd George, Britain’s prime ministers were, for differing reasons, unable or unwilling to bend their military commanders’ activities (Haig/Robertson) to civilian strategy.