Goldwater-Nichols and Civ-Mil Relations

Cohen, Eliot. "A Theory of Civilian Control," in Supreme Command.

Cohen reviews the main body of thought behind U.S. civil-military relations - Samuel P. Huntington (The Soldier and the State). In his work, Huntington identified a distinctive military mindset; a distinct definition of military officers as a unique profession - directly relating to the management and application of force; and two forms of civilian control over this fighting force - subjective and objective. Objective control, Huntington said, is necessary for a professional, apolitical military. Cohen summarizes the major arguments for and against this theory and offers a slightly more fluid/hybrid take on Huntington's principles, calling for a more nuanced definition of objective control.

Interesting point Cohen makes is the influence of Huntington views on the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. Question: while the intent of Goldwater-Nichols was to solidify an objective control approach to civ-mil relations, did it in fact undermine civilian control? Christopher Bourne seemed to think so in 1998, after the 10-year anniversary of the legislation, when he wrote in Joint Force Quarterly that the consequences were "reducing the checks and balances within and between the executive and legislative branches."

Another question is ... how does the structure of the officer and NCO corps affect the value set, distinctive culture, etc that Cohen discusses? For example, the structure of the NCO corps in the IDF is vastly different (well, non-existent in some lines) according to Patrick Lang's blog, Sic Semper Tyrannis. Leading to a relative breakdown of internal control, particularly on the tactical end of the stick. Sounds a little like Tolstoy's strategic nihilism.