The Dynamics of Doctrine:

The Change in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War.

Lupfer, Timothy T. Leavenworth Paper No 4., (US Army CGSC: Ft Leavenworth, KS 1981)

DOCTRINAL CHANGE DURING CONFLICT:

-The role of leadership is crucial; it should be based on sound tactical principles, input and lessons learned from front-line units and leaders. Doctrine should not be seen as inflexible dogma, to be applied as an article of faith regardless of the situation. Nor should it be a substitute for good judgment. Doctrine is an army’s collective memory, preserving sound principles as a tool for leaders to be adjusted to the situation.
German doctrinal change in 1916-1918

-Serious undertaking; the German Army had deeply ingrained habits from years of intensive peacetime training. (The US Army underwent a similar doctrinal overhaul in 2007-2008, with similar organizational pain.) Successful change of doctrine during conflict demonstrates a thorough process:
· Perception of a need for change
· Solicitation of ideas, especially from battlefield units
· Definition of the change
· Dissemination of the change
· Enforcement throughout the army
· Modification of organization and equipment to accommodate the change
· Thorough training
· Evaluation of effectiveness
· Subsequent refinement
1914-1916 – German Defense focused on retaining ground; troops were packed into forward trenches, and suffered large casualties from Allied artillery. Germany could not keep up the rate of attrition. What is to be done?
20 AUG 1916 – Hindenburg and Ludendorff take over. Ludendorff spearheads a collective staff effort to revamp German defensive doctrine to increase effectiveness while lessening attrition.
German officer interactions reveal a corporate mindset that discouraged “cult of personality” and encouraged teamwork and success. Ludendorff displayed a particular genius for getting the best effort from subordinates and for not falling into the trap of self aggrandizement. Ludendorff was one of many high-level German leaders who visited units seeking effective lessons learned. Ludendorff also used telephone extensively to remain informed. Small, hard working staff took ideas from the field, and refined them into new doctrine.

Elastic Defense in Depth
-Force the enemy to culminate, instead of focusing on holding ground at all cost. Very aggressive, focused on counterattack. Initiative at the lowest possible level was required and encouraged. Principles were:
· The defender must not surrender the initiative to the attacker
· The defense must rely on firepower, not large numbers of troops
· The defender must not hold ground at all costs
· The defender must consider depth for all construction and positions.
Enforcement and Application had some problems; there was skepticism that “those bastards from staff” could provide good doctrine for front line units, although this was mitigated as units recognized their own ideas in the new doctrine (collective ownership, encouraged by Ludendorff.) Ludendorff crushed commanders who blew off the new doctrine, but was very tolerant of commanders who respectfully questioned it, even publishing COL von Lossberg’s criticism as part of an official training directive. Independent thought and flexible application of the new doctrine was encouraged.

Training was conducted by units behind the lines – speaking from experience this must have been VERY difficult to do effectively, both from a personnel and logistical standpoint. However, new retraining and live fire training are absolutely essential for this kind of a change.
New, more appropriate and effective equipment was distributed to units. Units were reorganized; a new aggressive spirit was nurtured.

Allied offensives in 1917 got mauled (in general) by the new German defensive doctrine. Doctrine was constantly reexamined, revised, and adapted to local conditions. Doctrine was flexible, a means to an end, not an end in itself.

New Offense Doctrine (Storm troopers)
Germany decided that it had to go on the offensive and win before American strength came into play; also, Russia is out of the war so the German divisions from the eastern front now come to the western front. German expertise on offense came from:
· German offensive success in Russia, Italy, etc.
· German aggressive offensive tactics in the defense in 1917 (Storm troopers)
· Allies showing the Germans what NOT to do
· Captured and translated tactical booklet by French CPT Laffargue (not implemented by Allies.)

German objective was to achieve a penetration of the Allied line, for a strategic breakthrough.

Germany could not rely on huge numbers of artillery shells, and they knew long bombardments ruined surprise. German artillery doctrine changed to allow short, intense, accurate surprise bombardments to disrupt – rather than destroy – enemy troops, artillery, communications, HQ, etc. Strong reliance on gas shells; persistent mustard in areas not to be attacked, non-persistent chlorine and phosgene in areas to be attacked. Artillery tactics were much improved by Georg Bruchmuller.

Infantry-Artillery coordination was stressed; the rate of the artillery barrage was dictated by the rate of infantry movement, not the other way around.

German infantry organized in depth; Lead units would bypass pockets of Allied resistance and keep going, leaving follow-on forces to mop up resistance. Infantry units relied on high standards of small unit leadership and initiative. Infantry units were equipped with light machine guns, trench mortars, flamethrowers, and horse drawn light artillery.

Prior to the April 1918 offensives, there were 4 months of intensive training (just as there had been when implementing the new defensive doctrine in 1916-17.) Due to time and logistical constraints, only 56 divisions were designated as “Attack” Divisions, while the other 136 were given a lower priority as Trench Divisions, causing resentment. A reserve of leaders were kept available to rapidly replace dead leaders.

21 MAR 1918: The German offensive begins. Great success; 140 square miles seized. German casualties were only slightly higher than Allied casualties (an attacker should statistically take 3x as many casualties as a defender.) Large numbers of British prisoners attest to the extent of the German offensive success.

However, despite significant effort to follow up the success, German artillery and supplies simply could not keep up with the advance, and the offensive stalled. In addition, an earlier deliberate decision by Ludendorff to sideline the development of a German tank may have left a shortcoming. By August 1918, the German army was exhausted and able to be overcome by fresh Allied forces.

GENERALIZATIONS

Although Germany lost the war, it generally displayed superior ability in the development and implementation of new tactics. German doctrine achieved the balance between the demands of precision for unity of effort and the demands of flexibility for decentralized application.

German leaders did not invest concepts or buzzwords with inherent power – their tactics were principles to adapt to the battlefield. Their tactics did not even have a name until the Allies gave them (an inaccurate) one.

Cause and effect relationships were closely considered; Germans did not change doctrine for its own sake, but recommended and executed changes when conditions demanded it. Change was treated with caution and respect, and the Germans remained very conscious of their army’s ability to actually carry out the new doctrine… or not. The Germans relied on extensive and exhaustive training to remedy this, with very good results.

The Allies, on the other hand, relied on “cult of personality” individual leaders to lead – or resist – change through personal charisma and followers. This led to a very haphazard and distorted effect regarding tactical change; it was rarely implemented fully or uniformly enough, and when tactical change worked in one situation, it’s proponent (Nivelle) would apply it in the wrong context as holy writ with disastrous results.