Robert Jervis, “War and Misperception,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (Spring 1988), 675-700.
It's worth keeping Jervis' definition of misperception in mind while reading this article. He says misperception includes "inaccurate inferences, miscalculations of consequences and misjudgments about how others will react to one's policies."
A few interesting points ... Jervis' discussion of risk-aversion for gains and risk-acceptance for losses and the role this psychological phenomenon can play in conflict. Is this prospect theory (making decisions while dealing with risk)? Levy has an article on prospect theory and rational choice which may be useful.
An important question broached after a discussion of misperceptions in WWI and WWII: did the misperceptions cause the war? Did they even matter at the end of the day? Jervis references Stein, who argues that misperception can lead to cooperation, not just conflict, and questions whether a linkage between a misperception and an impact on the actor's behavior and final outcomes is, in fact, fait accompli.
Most of the conversation on misperception focuses on historical precedent and the Cold War guessing game. I'm interested in what our key perception dilemmas are post-Cold War. In particular, the number of conflicts we are now engaged in where misperceptions occur on a nation state level (Saddam's possession of WMD) and a sub-state/transnational level (al-Qaeda - Bin Laden actually substantiated his threats).
Showing posts with label Cold War. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cold War. Show all posts
Monday, October 5, 2009
Saturday, September 26, 2009
Cultural theories supplement, not supplant realism
Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," International Security 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998), 141-170.
Desch discusses culturalism in security studies. In this nicely organized article he reviews three waves of cultural theories, three problems with assessing the explanatory power of current cultural theories, and three ways culture can supplement (not supplant, as he says quite emphatically) existing theories in national security. While the common thread of these cultural theories seems to be a repudiation of realism, Desch points out that many critiques of realism come from its own adherents, citing Schweller, in an article on bandwagoning vs. balancing (unrelated, but looks like a good discussion of Walt's "balance-of-threat" theory).
Wave I contains little detail; Wave II (Cold War) has a few interesting details. Of interest is the view at the time that the U.S. was cultural inept when it came to strategy, in contrast with the "Clausewitzian" Soviets. Vietnam was used to illustrate this criticism (there does seem to be some merit if you look at McNamara and the whiz kids trying to apply cutting-edge capabilities in a context bereft of cultural understanding). However, Desch points out the similarities between Vietnam and the Soviets' experiment in Afghanistan; and if we look at failure from a relative standpoint, we didn't come out quite as bad as the Soviets did. Wave III, being in full-swing at the time of writing, is where most of the time is spent. Question: have any of the 3rd wave views/concepts gained traction over the last decade? Faded? What is the current cultural contribution to national security studies?
Desch discusses culturalism in security studies. In this nicely organized article he reviews three waves of cultural theories, three problems with assessing the explanatory power of current cultural theories, and three ways culture can supplement (not supplant, as he says quite emphatically) existing theories in national security. While the common thread of these cultural theories seems to be a repudiation of realism, Desch points out that many critiques of realism come from its own adherents, citing Schweller, in an article on bandwagoning vs. balancing (unrelated, but looks like a good discussion of Walt's "balance-of-threat" theory).
Wave I contains little detail; Wave II (Cold War) has a few interesting details. Of interest is the view at the time that the U.S. was cultural inept when it came to strategy, in contrast with the "Clausewitzian" Soviets. Vietnam was used to illustrate this criticism (there does seem to be some merit if you look at McNamara and the whiz kids trying to apply cutting-edge capabilities in a context bereft of cultural understanding). However, Desch points out the similarities between Vietnam and the Soviets' experiment in Afghanistan; and if we look at failure from a relative standpoint, we didn't come out quite as bad as the Soviets did. Wave III, being in full-swing at the time of writing, is where most of the time is spent. Question: have any of the 3rd wave views/concepts gained traction over the last decade? Faded? What is the current cultural contribution to national security studies?
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
